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LOCATING THE LOGIC OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
 IN LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES:  





I   INTRODUCTION 
Transitional justice comprises ‘the full range of processes and mechanisms 
associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large- 
scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and  
achieve reconciliation’.1 Nothing in this definition limits transitional justice to 
post-conflict or post-authoritarian states. Yet, practically, the field is wedded to 
the paradigmatic transition – a liberal democratic state rising from the ashes of a 
collapsed authoritarian regime. Despite widespread recognition that transitional 
justice processes need to be contextualised, this image retains a powerful hold 
over the field’s theory and practice. Orthodox application of transitional justice 
measures is thus still primarily legalistic, focusing on violations of civil and 
political rights, and unsure of its place in conflicted or stable democracies where 
a total politico-legal rupture is absent. In this article I reconceptualise transitional 
justice away from the paradigmatic form, re-centre it on its philosophical 
fundamentals, and explore its relevance and utility for established liberal 
democracies2 founded on legacies of historic injustice.  
My approach involves discerning the teleology of transitional justice. A 
teleological approach has the benefit of abstracting the field away from the 
paradigmatic transition and the problematic assumptions that it entails. When 
distilled to its fundamental aim we see that the purpose of transitional justice is 
                                                 
*  PhD Candidate, UNSW Faculty of Law. This paper was written as a Transitional Justice Leadership 
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1 Kofi Annan, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-conflict Societies: Report of 
the Secretary-General, UN Doc S/2004/616 (23 August 2004) 4 [8], 9 [25] (‘Report of the Secretary-
General’). 
2  Also described as ‘consolidated democracies’: Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic 
Transition and Consolidation (John Hopkins University Press, 1996) 15. 
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the struggle for a more just social contract. This understanding accurately 
encompasses both paradigmatic applications of transitional justice, such as in 
South Africa and Chile, as well as the non-paradigmatic forms, such as in 
Northern Ireland and Australia. But transitional justice as a transformation from 
‘unjust relations to just relations’ 3  is not simply a process of constitutional 
redemption,4 or a ‘deepening of substantive democracy’5 – it is still transitional 
justice. The great significance of the field is its Janus-faced nature. While 
constitutional redemption is purely forward looking, transitional justice 
recognises that the past is always with us. In mediating the past, the present and 
the future, transitional justice understands that political commitment to a more 
just future can only be secured by acknowledgement of past wrongs and the 
promise of reparative action.6  
In the last 50 years, established liberal democracies founded on historic 
injustice, or with a legacy of large-scale abuses, have begun to examine their 
past. In each case, the implicit or explicit justification for doing so has been 
reconciliatory – both in seeking fairer contemporary relations and in terms of 
building a shared normative history of the nation.7 This is true for Australia. 
Beginning in the late 1980s and continuing today, albeit in a haphazard and 
belated fashion, the Australian government has sought to promote a formal 
process of reconciliation between non-Indigenous and Indigenous Australians.8 
As a starting point this process has involved traditional transitional justice 
measures such as truth seeking, recognition and acknowledgment of past 
injustice, and institutional reform. Primary examples include the 1997 Bringing 
Them Home Report on the Stolen Generations,9 the 2008 Apology,10 the 1991 
Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody,11 and the 2006 Inquiry 
into Stolen Wages.12 However, while these processes and mechanisms are clearly 
                                                 
3  Jennifer Balint, Julie Evans and Nesam McMillan, ‘Rethinking Transitional Justice, Redressing 
Indigenous Harm: A New Conceptual Approach’ (2014) 8 International Journal of Transitional Justice 
194, 214. 
4  Luke Beck, ‘Jack Balkin’s Constitutionalism and the Expert Panel on Constitutional Recognition of 
Indigenous Australians’ (2014) 37 UNSW Law Journal 407, 427–31. 
5  Fionnuala Ní Aoláin and Colm Campbell, ‘The Paradox of Transition in Conflicted Democracies’ (2005) 
27 Human Rights Quarterly 172, 179. 
6  Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Between Impunity and Show Trials’ (2002) 6 Max Planck Yearbook of United 
Nations Law 1, 4. 
7  Roy Brooks, ‘The Age of Apology’ in Roy Brooks (ed), When Sorry Isn’t Enough: The Controversy over 
Apologies and Reparations for Human Injustice (New York University Press, 1999) 3, 3. 
8  See, eg, Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation Act 1991 (Cth). Note that under s 32 this Act ceased 
operation on 1 January 2001. For a critical examination of the formal reconciliation process running from 
1991 to 2001, see Damien Short, Reconciliation and Colonial Power: Indigenous Rights in Australia 
(Routledge, 2008). 
9  Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Bringing Them Home: Report of the National Inquiry 
into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from Their Families (1997).  
10  Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 13 February 2008, 167–73 (Kevin 
Rudd, Prime Minister of Australia) (known as the Apology to Australia’s Indigenous Peoples). 
11  Commonwealth, Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, National Report (1991). 
12  Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Parliament of Australia, Unfinished 
Business: Indigenous Stolen Wages (2006). 
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orientated towards transitional justice in their basic design and surrounding 
discourse, I focus on a different area of contestation.  
Stable property rights are foundational for any society. In settler colonies, 
where the foundation of the state is tied to Indigenous dispossession, this is 
perhaps even more so. It is not surprising then that the High Court of Australia’s 
decision in Mabo v Queensland [No 2] (‘Mabo’)13 created political shock waves 
across the country. What is surprising is that no scholar has examined Mabo or 
the resultant Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) (‘NTA’) under a transitional justice 
lens.14 The absence of a total politico-legal rupture in Australia is significant, for 
it means that Indigenous Australians must work within the former (albeit 
modified) system. Mabo and the NTA have thus had unintended consequences. 
On the one hand they have standardised the system of land reform in Australia,15 
creating a narrow but clear legal pathway for Indigenous groups to ensure 
Australian law respects and protects their property rights over their traditional 
land. On the other hand, this process of standardisation has robbed the land-
reform system of much energy and has dramatically reduced its utility and 
relevance for many Indigenous Australians. An appreciation of these conflicting 
dynamics could lead to a more satisfactory approach to property restoration in all 
states with discriminatory and unequal land distribution. This goal is vitally 
important in all such states, but acutely so for people whose lives and culture are 
intimately tied to land.  
This article is divided into three parts. In Part II, I explore the intellectual 
history of transitional justice, locating its origins in a series of regime changes in 
South America in the 1980s. I then change tack and tease out some of the 
assumptions underlying the field, arguing that a range of implicit Western biases 
have conceptually constrained transitional justice to the paradigmatic context, 
and generally ignored Indigenous peoples. This is critical background for Part III, 
where I set out and answer the normative question: should the logic of 
transitional justice be decoupled from its paradigmatic form? An affirmative 
answer detaches the field from these problematic assumptions, allowing 
differentiation between transitional justice as a field, and transitional justice 
processes and mechanisms designed to achieve particular aims. In this sense, 
‘transitional justice’ can be conceived of as an umbrella, under which sit a range 
of sui generis processes and mechanisms designed and applied in disparate 
situations according to context. While I acknowledge that an elastic notion of 
transitional justice is not an uncritical good, arguments seeking to exclude its 
application to established liberal democracies are not persuasive. Under a 
teleological approach, transitional justice can be understood as a process of 
                                                 
13  (1992) 171 CLR 1. 
14  For an analysis that tangentially touches on this issue, see Joe Williams, ‘Confessions of a Native Judge: 
Reflections on the Role of Transitional Justice in the Transformation of Indigeneity’ in Lisa Strelein (ed), 
Dialogue About Land Justice: Papers from the National Native Title Conference (Aboriginal Studies 
Press, 2010) 19. 
15  Note, however, the statutory land rights regimes that exist at the state and territory level and overlap and 
compete with native title. 
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transforming past unjust relations into just relations. As such, the field has 
relevance for liberal democracies founded on, and confronting, legacies of 
historic injustice. The relevant question is what particular transitional justice 
processes should be applied.  
Part IV analyses land reform in Australia as a process of transitional justice. I 
begin by examining the Mabo decision, arguing that despite not amounting to an 
explosive total politico-legal rupture, the decision shifted the normative 
foundations of the nation.16 In doing so, it propagated significant moral capital 
that was employed by a receptive government to enact the NTA, a statutory 
compromise approaching ‘quasi- or pseudo-constitutional’17 status that sought to 
tread the line between destabilising backward-looking corrective justice and 
forward-looking security of tenure. My focus on the NTA is on the process of 
native title determinations.18 The vast majority of native title claims have been 
determined via consent.19 In large part, these determinations can be seen as a 
series of individual, negotiated transitions between elements of predecessor and 
successor regimes. However, in practice, the promise of comprehensive 
agreements – of treaties by another name 20  – has not been met. The NTA’s 
inadequacies have led to creative use of non-native title settlements – agreements 
that continue the transition. Although my focus is on land, I conclude by noting 
how the logic of transitional justice should inform the broader contemporary 
push towards constitutional recognition of Indigenous Australians and beyond. 
While less clearly marking a liminal moment, this process marks a continuation 
towards a more just society that is also embedded in rectifying historic injustice.  
 
II   THE PARADIGMATIC TRANSITION 
The collapse of neighbouring South American authoritarian states in the late 
1980s threw up a recurring, impossible question loaded with political, legal and 
moral conundrums: should corrective justice be prioritised, or must the country 
look forward and ‘bury the past’21 in a spirit of constitutional redemption?22 This 
question, and the various answers developed in each state, catalysed comparative 
study focusing on a range of mechanisms designed to: (1) end conflict;  
                                                 
16  See, eg, Wik Peoples v Queensland (1996) 187 CLR 1, 182 (Gummow J). 
17  Bret Walker, ‘The Legal Shortcomings of Native Title’ in Sean Brennan et al (eds), Native Title from 
Mabo to Akiba: A Vehicle for Change and Empowerment? (Federation Press, 2015) 14, 14–15.  
18  Although taking this focus I do not ignore the fact that the NTA ratifies substantial past injustice, 
preventing a significant majority of Indigenous people from relying on it to claim rights to their 
traditional lands. 
19  See below Part IV(B)(1). 
20  Writing in 1993, Garth Nettheim suggests that the negotiated settlements may become ‘treaties under 
another name’: Garth Nettheim, ‘“The Consent of the Natives”: Mabo and Indigenous Political Rights’ 
(1993) 15 Sydney Law Review 223, 236. 
21  Huw Watkin, ‘Irony Not Lost as Hun Sen “Buries” the Past’, South China Morning Post (Hong Kong) 30 
December 1998, 9 (regarding Cambodia).  
22  Bruce Ackerman, The Future of Liberal Revolution (Yale University Press, 1992) ch 5. 
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(2) reconcile the new nation to its past; and (3) sow the seeds for a just and 
equitable future. The model was quickly adopted and spread across the globe – 
first to transitions from communist rule in Eastern Europe, then most famously in 
South Africa. Today the model has travelled widely to weakly institutionalised 
post-atrocity countries such as Sierra Leone, Rwanda and Cambodia; and even 
belatedly and somewhat haphazardly to liberal democracies coming to terms  
with historic injustice.23 However, the failings of transitional justice to achieve 
comparable successes in its new environs, and a recognition of its narrow focus 
on a peculiar set of violations, has led to a recent re-imagining of the field. In 
particular, a series of problematic assumptions underlying the paradigmatic 
transition have come to light. This Part begins by outlining the traditional 
concept of transitional justice, before exploring some of those assumptions. This 
background will set the scene for Part III’s focus on a critical normative question: 
should the logic of transitional justice be decoupled from its paradigmatic form?  
 
A   What Is Transitional Justice? 
Transitional justice refers to a set of moral, political, and legal questions  
that challenge societies confronting a legacy of systematic or large-scale human 
rights abuse. Comprising both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, it aims  
to end impunity for rights violations and inculcate or establish the conditions  
for civic trust, with the ultimate aim being the creation of an inclusive, 
democratic, political community.24 In explicitly grounding itself in a ‘holistic, 
restorative approach to justice’, 25  it sees justice, peace and democracy as 
‘mutually reinforcing imperatives’ such that ‘neglect of one inevitably leads to 
the weakening of others’.26 Transitional justice measures and processes are thus 
wide-ranging, including individual criminal prosecutions, truth and reconciliation 
commissions, vetting and lustration programs, institutional structural reform, 
access to police and government records, constitution building, and 
memorialisation and public apologies. These processes and mechanisms are 
                                                 
23  The literature on transitional justice is voluminous. In addition to the sources cited in this article, for 
specific case studies on particular countries or particular measures, see the International Center for 
Transitional Justice’s research and publications pages: International Center for Transitional Justice, 
Publications (2016) <https://www.ictj.org/publications>; International Center for Transitional Justice, 
Research (2016) <https://www.ictj.org/research>. See also Ulster University, Transitional Justice 
Institute (2016) <http://www.ulster.ac.uk/research-and-innovation/research-institutes/transitional-justice-
institute>; University of Oxford Faculty of Law, Oxford Transitional Justice Research 
<https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/oxford-transitional-justice-research>; Transitional 
Justice Research Collaborative <https://transitionaljusticedata.com>; Historical Justice and Memory 
Network, Historical Dialogues, Justice, and Memory Network (2016) <http://historicaldialogues.org>.  
24  Pablo de Greiff, ‘Theorizing Transitional Justice’ in Melissa S Williams, Rosemary Nagy and Jon Elster 
(eds), Transitional Justice: NOMOS LI (NYU Press, 2012) 31, 33–4; Rama Mani, ‘Rebuilding an 
Inclusive Political Community after War’ (2005) 36 Security Dialogue 511, 512. See also Pablo de 
Greiff, ‘A Normative Conception of Transitional Justice’ (2010) 50(3) Politorbis 17, 22–5. 
25  Ronli Sifris, ‘The Four Pillars of Transitional Justice: A Gender-Sensitive Analysis’ in Sarah Joseph and 
Adam McBeth (eds), Research Handbook on International Human Rights Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, 
2010) 272, 272. 
26  Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc S/2004/616, 1, 9 [24].  
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drawn from a set of four pillars: truth, justice, reparations, and guarantees of non-
repetition.27 
Much of the difficulty transitioning states face involves balancing these 
goals. It is not hard to see how they may conflict. For example, criminal 
prosecution of former elites may endanger the security of the new government, 
particularly where the former elites retain political or military strength;28  the 
promotion of an accurate historical record may require the granting of amnesties 
or guarantees of non-prosecution for perpetrators;29 and, reparations payments 
may conflict with budgetary priorities such as healthcare, education, or policing 
and security.30 But these goals can also be mutually reinforcing. Acting on an 
‘ethic of responsibility’ may secure the new government’s security, opening up 
possibilities for prosecution of former leaders (long) after the immediate 
transition.31  
A central element in transitional justice theory is the idea of mediating the 
past, the present and the future. Transitional justice is thus commonly conceived 
of as Janus-faced; any successful transition ‘must deal with abuses of the past … 
[address] the crimes of the present’,32 and establish conditions for a just social 
compact going forward. In this way transitional justice is retributive, restorative 
and redemptive, seeking to punish violations, repair the harms of the past and 
restore hope for the future. Trials, truth commissions and other like mechanisms 
are expected to ‘develop narratives about past violence, settle accounts and 
demonstrate the truth’.33 Institutional acknowledgement and public denunciation 
of policies that perpetrated violence is thought to legitimate the new 
government’s institutions and promote reconciliation. It is no wonder that many 
scholars consider transitional justice overburdened or crippled by internal 
contradictions.34  
The role of the international community is complex. Subtly, the presence of 
international actors can bring important technical expertise and comparative 
                                                 
27  Pablo de Greiff, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation and 
Guarantees of Non-recurrence, UN Doc A/HRC/21/46 (9 August 2012).  
28  Paul van Zyl, ‘Justice without Punishment: Guaranteeing Human Rights in Transitional Societies’ in 
András Sajó (ed), Out of and into Authoritarian Law (Kluwer Law International, 2003) 53, 54–5. 
29  See, eg, The Azanian Peoples Organization v President of the Republic of South Africa [1996] 4 SA 672 
(Constitutional Court) [17]–[19], [22].  
30  Many countries have imposed caps on reparation payouts to protect other budgetary priorities. See, eg, 
Romania’s Emergency Government Ordinance 62/2010 limiting moral damages for political 
imprisonment to €10 000 for direct victims: Ordonanţă de urgenţă nr 62/2010 din 30 iunie 2010 
[Emergency Ordinance No 62/2010 of 30 June 2010] (Romania). See Lavinia Stan, Transitional Justice 
in Post-communist Romania: The Politics of Memory (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 177. 
31  José Zalaquett, ‘Balancing Ethical Imperatives and Political Constraints: The Dilemma of New 
Democracies Confronting Past Human Rights Violations’ (1992) 43 Hastings Law Journal 1425, 1429–
30. 
32  Neil Kritz, ‘Progress and Humility: The Ongoing Search for Post-conflict Justice’ in M Cherif Bassiouni 
(ed), Post-conflict Justice (Transnational Publishers, 2002) 55, 86. 
33  Anna Macdonald, ‘Local Understandings and Experiences of Transitional Justice: A Review of the 
Evidence’ (Paper No 6, Justice and Security Research Programme, July 2013) 19. 
34  Kora Andrieu, ‘Political Liberalism after Mass Violence: John Rawls and a “Theory” of Transitional 
Justice’ in Susanne Buckley-Zistel et al (eds), Transitional Justice Theories (Routledge, 2014) 85, 97. 
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analysis to transitional institutions; building capacity in, and support for, those 
institutions. Playing a mediating role, their existence can also nudge conflicting 
parties and stakeholders towards compromise. However, it is the local 
communities themselves that must own the process – and here the role of 
international actors drifts into the paradoxical. Scholars and practitioners 
recognise that transitional justice measures must be adapted to the specific 
context in which they are applied; yet, at the same time, these measures must 
‘reflect transcendent values that cannot be modified’.35  
Although political regimes have collapsed throughout history,36 transitional 
justice as a concept emerged in the wake of the breakdown of authoritarian 
regimes across South America in the 1980s. Paige Arthur’s intellectual history 
links its origins to a confluence of two major developments within these regime 
changes: the shift in human rights activism towards challenging impunity, and a 
realisation of the role that such activism could play instrumentally in promoting 
or catalysing democratic reform.37 The guarded successes of the South American 
transitions, the rise of globalisation, and the triumph of economic capitalism 
catapulted transitional justice across the globe: from Eastern Europe, to South 
Africa, and onwards. Transitional justice became ‘the norm’.38  However, the 
normalisation of transitional justice and its application across vastly diffuse 
societies has not had the desired results. In hindsight, the problem is clear.  
The South American transitions were de-contextualised and abstracted from  
their origins, and through a process of acculturation, practitioners and scholars 
applied supposedly ‘universalist’ legal models to situations that required distinct 
approaches.39 The failings of this early global application of transitional justice 
led critics to examine the assumptions that underlay the paradigmatic model. The 
following section will tease out some of these problematic assumptions with the 
aim of questioning whether the logic of transitional justice has utility for non-
paradigmatic societies.  
 
                                                 
35  Rosalind Shaw and Lars Waldorf, ‘Introduction’ in Rosalind Shaw, Lars Waldorf and Pierre Hazan (eds), 
Localizing Transitional Justice: Interventions and Priorities after Mass Violence (Stanford University 
Press, 2010) 3, 5, critiquing the Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc S/2004/616. 
36  Jon Elster examines Athenian ‘transitional justice’ processes in 411 BCE and 403 BCE: Jon Elster, 
Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective (Cambridge University Press, 2004) 3–
23. 
37  Paige Arthur, ‘How “Transitions” Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional 
Justice’ (2009) 31 Human Rights Quarterly 321. 
38  Ruti Teitel, ‘Transitional Justice Genealogy’ (2003) 16 Harvard Human Rights Journal 69, 71. 
39  James Cavallaro and Sebastián Albuja, ‘The Lost Agenda: Economic Crimes and Truth Commissions in 
Latin America and Beyond’ in Kieran McEvoy and Lorna McGregor (eds), Transitional Justice from 
Below: Grassroots Activism and the Struggle for Change (Hart Publishing, 2008) 121, 126. 
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B Assumptions behind the Theory 
There is increasing acceptance among scholars that the orthodox model of 
transitional justice largely evinces Western biases. 40  As Arthur’s intellectual 
history illustrates, the concept evolved out of the dilemmas faced by human 
rights activists seeking to respond to Latin American states transitioning from 
authoritarian rule in the late 1980s and early 1990s.41 The peculiar characteristics 
of South American ancien régimes, ie, relatively strongly institutionalised 
countries – vertically, horizontally and sectorally – became the focal point for the 
field.42 In this way, conventional transitional justice theory prioritises individual 
criminal accountability and rule of law reform as part of the transition to 
democratic government, rather than structural injustice or the socio-economic 
deprivations that lie at the root of many conflicts. Additionally, the sudden 
collapse of these regimes and their corresponding ‘transition to democracy’ is 
problematic, suggesting that transitional justice is merely an issue for poorer 
countries of the Global South.  
The prioritisation of individual criminal accountability and rule of law reform 
within transitional justice can be explained by its intellectual and historical 
origins. Shaped and influenced by human rights law, criminal justice, the liberal 
peace thesis and the South American transitions,43 transitional justice focused on 
‘justiciable’ violations 44  and targeted those who were individually criminally 
responsible. These essentially short-term mechanisms were designed to protect 
individuals from horizontal and vertical violations of bodily integrity, and leave 
problematic matters of distributive justice to the political process – post-
transition – once negative rights had been secured. Thus criminal prosecution 
emerged as the central element of any transitional justice initiative. Although 
recent scholarship interrogates the possibility that socio-economic injustice may 
be treated as an international crime, international criminal law’s role in this 
                                                 
40  See, eg, Rosemary Nagy, ‘Transitional Justice as Global Project: Critical Reflections’ (2008) 29 Third 
World Quarterly 275; Lia Kent, The Dynamics of Transitional Justice: International Models and Local 
Realities in East Timor (Routledge, 2013) ch 1; Khanyisela Moyo, ‘Mimicry, Transitional Justice and the 
Land Question in Racially Divided Former Settler Colonies’ (2015) 9 International Journal of 
Transitional Justice 70; Dustin Sharp, ‘Interrogating the Peripheries: The Preoccupations of Fourth 
Generation Transitional Justice’ (2012) 26 Harvard Human Rights Journal 149; Patricia Lundy and Mark 
McGovern, ‘The Role of Community in Participatory Transitional Justice’ in Kieran McEvoy and Lorna 
McGregor (eds), Transitional Justice from Below: Grassroots Activism and the Struggle for Change 
(Hart Publishing, 2008) 99, 101. 
41  Arthur, above n 37, 323–4.  
42  Ryan Goodman, Interview with Pablo de Greiff, Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truth, Justice, 
Reparation and Guarantees of Non-Recurrence (NYU School of Law, 23 February 2015). On whether 
transitional justice can be characterised as a field at all, see Christine Bell, ‘Transitional Justice, 
Interdisciplinarity and the State of the “Field” or “Non-Field”’ (2009) 3 International Journal of 
Transitional Justice 5, 6. 
43 Lars Waldorf, ‘Anticipating the Past: Transitional Justice and Socio-economic Wrongs’ (2012) 21 Social 
& Legal Studies 171, 173. 
44  With the implicit assumption that economic and social rights violations are not justiciable.  
520 UNSW Law Journal Volume 39(2) 
respect has so far been ‘marginal’.45 Alternative mechanisms have adopted a 
similar approach, prioritising individual accountability. For example, Ruben 
Carranza notes that between 1974 and 2004, 34 truth commissions were 
established worldwide. Of these, only three ‘expressly engaged with economic 
crimes, socioeconomic rights violations or a set of crimes that necessarily 
incorporates past acts of corruption’.46  
This almost singular focus on individual accountability privileges ‘legalistic 
approaches’,47 adopting Kenneth Roth’s tripartite, ‘violation, violator, remedy’48 
methodology of human rights activism. Of course, as many scholars have pointed 
out, the division of rights is a matter of framing and ideology rather than a natural 
position.49 Indeed, Roth himself notes that reconceptualising poverty and severe 
deprivation, not as a product of insufficient public goods but as a consequence of 
an officially promoted or tolerated policy of social exclusion, may lead to better 
protection and enforcement of economic and social rights.50 In any case, respect 
for human rights requires that activists confront issues of distributive justice, 
rather than render them invisible.51 That economic, social and cultural rights do 
not involve a precise correlation between violator and victim, or may be 
practically impossible to accomplish, does not deny the ‘ethical status of these 
claims’.52  
The marginalisation of economic, social and cultural rights within transitional 
justice largely reflects the dominant, Western conception of a division between 
negative and positive rights.53 However, the absence of socio-economic justice 
from transitional justice is more than ‘simply a repetition of the problems of 
human rights’,54 and its neglect potentially creates fundamental challenges for the 
field. Most obviously, failure to incorporate wider notions of social justice 
ignores the fact that ‘historically constructed socioeconomic inequalities’ are 
                                                 
45  Larissa van den Herik, ‘Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: International Criminal Law’s Blind 
Spot?’ in Eibe Riedel, Gilles Giacca and Christophe Golay (eds), Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
in International Law: Contemporary Issues and Challenges (Oxford University Press, 2014) 343, 366; 
Evelyne Schmid, Taking Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Seriously in International Criminal Law 
(Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
46  Ruben Carranza, ‘Plunder and Pain: Should Transitional Justice Engage with Corruption and Economic 
Crimes’ (2008) 2 International Journal of Transitional Justice 310, 315. These three truth commissions 
were in Chad, Liberia and Sierra Leone. 
47  Nagy, ‘Transitional Justice as Global Project’, above n 40, 284.  
48  Kenneth Roth, ‘Defending Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Practical Issues Faced by an 
International Human Rights Organization’ (2004) 26 Human Rights Quarterly 63, 68. 
49  See, eg, Henry Shue, Basic Rights, Subsistence, Affluence, and US Foreign Policy (Princeton University 
Press, 1996); Stephen Holmes and Cass R Sunstein, The Cost of Rights: Why Liberty Depends on Taxes 
(W W Norton, 2000). 
50  Roth, above n 48, 72–3. 
51  Zinaida Miller, ‘Effects of Invisibility: In Search of the “Economic” in Transitional Justice’ (2008) 2 
International Journal of Transitional Justice 266, 268.  
52  Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (Harvard University Press, 2009) 383. 
53  Louise Arbour, ‘Economic and Social Justice for Societies in Transition’ (2007) 40 New York University 
Journal of International Law and Politics 1, 4–7. On the division between rights, see Maurice Cranston, 
‘Are There Any Human Rights?’ (1983) 112(4) Daedalus 1. 
54  Miller, ‘Effects of Invisibility’, above n 51, 268. 
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often the driver of recurrent conflict, 55  and thus threatens the viability of 
transitional justice as an effective mechanism for securing justice. Equally, a 
narrow focus on individual accountability can ignore the gendered aspect of 
conflict. As primary caregivers and heads of households, women are 
disproportionate victims of socio-economic harm.56  
Further, the notion of ‘transition’ itself presents challenges. Semantically, 
transition denotes a shift or change from one condition to another. This implies a 
point of ‘rupture’,57 delineating the temporal pre-transition period from that of 
post-transition, and is suggestive of a ‘dramatic end of one era and the 
commencement of a new one’.58 But a transition does not have to be ‘one “big 
bang” event’, and could instead refer to ‘incremental and progressive change 
over a long period’.59 Equally, a moment of transition need not be completely 
destructive of the past, but can rather mark a slight but perceptible shift in the 
foundation of a nation. The field’s reification of a liminal moment denoting the 
sudden collapse of an authoritarian regime creates ontological biases. As the 
transition from Mubarak authoritarianism to el-Sisi authoritarianism in Egypt 
demonstrates, these moments are only potential transitional moments. What is 
important is a ‘substantive normative change’ in the political authority of the 
state.60 As I will address in Part IV, the Mabo decision is an example of this 
slight, but perceptible normative change.61 Equally, the gradual development of 
an Indigenous rights consciousness among non-Indigenous Australian society, 
moving towards constitutional recognition, is an example of an incremental 
normative shift.  
Neither of these less explosive but no less momentous forms of transition are 
wholly accepted in paradigmatic transitional justice theory. Consequently, 
transitional justice scholars and practitioners struggle to approach structural 
injustice, for the very concept of an interregnum ‘can problematically obscure 
continuities of violence and exclusion’.62 But of course, ‘there is no such thing  
as a radical new beginning’.63 And yet, this simple fact has not prevented elite 
actors who organise and institute the transition from treating it as such. As 
Rosemary Nagy has noted, transitional justice processes in Iraq and Afghanistan 
focused exclusively on rights violations committed by Saddam Hussein and the 
                                                 
55  Ismael Muvingi, ‘Sitting on Powder Kegs: Socioeconomic Rights in Transitional Societies’ (2009) 3 
International Journal of Transitional Justice 163, 164. 
56  Christine Bell and Catherine O’Rourke, ‘Does Feminism Need a Theory of Transitional Justice? An 
Introductory Essay’ (2007) 1 International Journal of Transitional Justice 23, 34. 
57  Teitel, ‘Transitional Justice Genealogy’, above n 38, 86–7. 
58  Zinaida Miller, ‘(Re)Distributing Transition’ (2013) 7 International Journal of Transitional Justice 370, 
375. 
59  Ní Aoláin and Campbell, above n 5, 213. 
60  Stephen Winter, Transitional Justice in Established Democracies: A Political Theory (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2014) 56. 
61  See, eg, Wik Peoples v Queensland (1996) 187 CLR 1, 182 (Gummow J). 
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Taliban, artificially framing the transition problem as one of past violations rather 
than ‘the “now” of occupation, insurgency, and the war on terror’.64 Australian 
government responses to the Bringing Them Home Report mirrored this 
approach, with then Prime Minister John Howard refusing to apologise on behalf 
of this generation, in relation to the acts of earlier generations.65  
Regardless of whether the transition is characterised as one, or a series of 
events, another fundamental question arises: what are we transitioning from,  
and what are we transitioning to? While the answer to this question may  
be ‘slippery’,66 the implicit understanding is that of a liberalising narrative,67  
of history as progress, 68  a ‘move from less to more democratic regimes’. 69  
This teleological view of history helps to ‘install powerful ideological parameters 
that limit the field of possibility for new stories of transformation’.70 Thus, the 
almost universal focus on states marked by authoritarianism or mass atrocity 
dismisses the potential relevance of transitional justice theory to liberal 
democracies, suggesting that these states do not themselves have ‘endemic 
problems with gross violations of human rights’.71 If the transition is merely an 
instrument of democratisation,72 what bearing does it have for the West? Apart 
from revealing unhelpful attitudes of paternalism and neo-colonialism, 73  this 
approach substantively denies the benefit that the logic of transitional justice may 
                                                 
64  Nagy, ‘Transitional Justice as Global Project’, above n 40, 280. 
65  See, eg, Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 26 August 1999, 9205–9 
(John Howard, Prime Minister of Australia). 
66  Bronwyn Anne Leebaw, ‘The Irreconcilable Goals of Transitional Justice’ (2008) 30 Human Rights 
Quarterly 95, 101. 
67  Ruti Teitel, ‘Transitional Justice as Liberal Narrative’ in Ruti Teitel (ed), Globalizing Transitional 
Justice: Contemporary Essays (Oxford University Press, 2014) 95, 105.  
68  Pierre Hazan, ‘Transitional Justice After September 11: A New Rapport with Evil’ in Rosalind Shaw, 
Lars Waldorf and Pierre Hazan (eds), Localizing Transitional Justice: Interventions and Priorities after 
Mass Violence (Stanford University Press, 2010) 49, 55. 
69  Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice (Oxford University Press, 2000) 5. See also Neil Kritz, Transitional 
Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes (United States Institute of Peace, 
1995). 
70  Michael Rothberg, ‘Progress, Progression, Procession: William Kentridge and the Narratology of 
Transitional Justice’ (2012) 20 Narrative 1, 7. 
71  Thomas Obel Hansen, ‘Transitional Justice: Toward a Differentiated Theory’ (2011) 13 Oregon Review 
of International Law 1, 40. 
72  See, eg, Will Kymlicka, ‘Transitional Justice, Federalism, and the Accommodation of Minority 
Nationalism’ in Paige Arthur (ed), Identities in Transition: Challenges for Transitional Justice in Divided 
Societies (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 303, 328. 
73  Indeed scholars have linked transitional justice’s emergence with ‘the end of the Cold War and the 
euphoria of the presumed triumph of free market ideologies’. Thus, from its very beginning transitional 
justice was assumed to be, or positively directed to be, a ‘midwife of a democratic, rule-of-law state’: 
Makau Mutua, ‘What is the Future of Transitional Justice?’ (2015) 9 International Journal of 
Transitional Justice 1, 1. See also Dustin Sharp, ‘Emancipating Transitional Justice from the Bonds of 
the Paradigmatic Transition’ (2015) 9 International Journal of Transitional Justice 150; Dustin Sharp, 
‘Beyond the Post-conflict Checklist: Linking Peacebuilding and Transitional Justice through the Lens of 
Critique’ (2013) 14 Chicago Journal of International Law 165. Sharp argues that transitional justice is a 
‘handmaiden to liberal political transitions’: Sharp, ‘Emancipating Transitional Justice’, above n 73, 150, 
essentially replicating ‘Western liberal economic and governance models’ across the globe’: Sharp, 
‘Beyond the Post-conflict Checklist’, above n 73, 182. 
2016 Locating the Logic of Transitional Justice in Liberal Democracies 523 
have for politically-marginalised victims of historic injustice in established 
democracies.  
Having regard to these assumptions, it is unsurprising that transitional justice 
has generally ignored Indigenous peoples and their perspectives.74 Indeed, in its 
state-legitimating function, the transitional justice framework can stand in  
tension with individuals who may not feel part of the central government. 75 
Unfortunately, even where Indigenous peoples suffered the brunt of civil and 
political rights violations, such as in Peru and Guatemala, transitional justice 
processes designed to deal with those violations were often created without 
consultation,76 either ignoring Indigenous views or the character and extent of 
their suffering. Even post-transition, Indigenous peoples may continue to suffer 
from normalised structural violence. 
However, recently transitional justice mechanisms have begun to  
engage more directly with Indigenous perspectives,77 and processes to deal with 
Indigenous rights claims are increasingly understood as connected with 
transitional justice.78 For example, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of 
Canada, organised by parties to the Indian Residential Schools Settlement 
Agreement, examined state-sponsored, institutional harm over a 150-year 
period.79 Completed in 2015, the Commission was specifically intended to be part 
of a holistic and comprehensive response to the physical, psychological and 
sexual abuse suffered by over 150 000 First Nations children stolen from their 
families and sent to boarding schools to be assimilated into the dominant non-
Indigenous culture. Similarly, the Maine Wabanaki-State Child Welfare Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission examined the United States state of Maine’s 
child welfare policies under the Indian Child Welfare Act 1978, 25 USC § 1901–
63 (1978). Organised and led by Chiefs of the Wabanaki Confederacy, the 
                                                 
74  Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na´im, ‘Editorial Note: From the Neocolonial “Transitional” to Indigenous 
Formations of Justice’ (2013) 7 International Journal of Transitional Justice 197, 197. 
75  See, eg, Kymlicka, above n 72, 322; Courtney Jung, ‘Transitional Justice for Indigenous People in a Non-
transitional Society’ (Research Brief, International Center for Transitional Justice, October 2009) 2; 
Sarah Maddison and Laura J Shepherd, ‘Peacebuilding and the Postcolonial Politics of Transitional 
Justice’ (2014) 2 Peacebuilding 253. 
76  I thank Eduardo Gonzalez for making this point at the Center for Human Rights and Global Justice’s 
Twelfth Annual Emerging Scholarship Conference, New York University, 17 April 2015. See Ruth 
Rubio-Marín, Claudia Paz y Paz Bailey and Julie Guillerot, ‘Indigenous Peoples and Reparations Claims: 
Tentative Steps in Peru and Guatemala’ (Research Brief, International Center for Transitional Justice, 
June 2009). 
77  See, eg, International Center for Transitional Justice, ‘Strengthening Indigenous Rights through Truth 
Commissions: A Practitioner’s Resource’ (Guide, 2012). 
78  See below Part IV. See also the Treaty of Waitangi settlement process, which bears similarities with 
transitional justice processes: Winter, ‘Transitional Justice in Established Democracies’, above n 60; 
David Wishart, ‘Belated Justice? The Indian Claims Commission and the Waitangi Tribunal’ (2001) 25 
American Indian Culture and Research Journal 81. 
79  Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, Honoring the Truth, Reconciling for the Future: 
Summary of the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, Report (2015).  
524 UNSW Law Journal Volume 39(2) 
Commission was structured around Indigenous perspectives, emphasising ritual, 
performance, and oral participation.80  
This shift to incorporate Indigenous perspectives within transitional justice is 
entirely rational as there are strong intersections between Indigenous demands 
and the telos of transitional justice. Where designed carefully, culturally 
appropriate and Indigenous-led, as was the case in Canada and Maine, 
transitional justice processes may have the potential to help realise Indigenous 
rights in both paradigmatic and non-paradigmatic contexts.81 Nevertheless, owing 
to the position of Indigenous peoples vis-a-vis the state, success should be 
measured differently. Rather than assessing whether a particular mechanism 
performs standard functions such as memorialisation, its success must be 
measured by its ‘capacity to transform the playing field’.82 Each process must be 
able to transcend its own strictures, complement the transition as a whole and 
assist in turning political commitment into political action.83  
 
III   DECOUPLING THE LOGIC OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
FROM ITS PARADIGMATIC FORM 
The unveiling of problematic assumptions undergirding the paradigmatic 
transition creates both challenges and opportunities for the field. On the one 
hand, the recognition that transitional justice is loaded with inherent biases and 
assumptions suggests cogent reasons why its record, outside South America, has 
been ‘mixed’.84 It is not surprising that a field designed for relatively strongly 
institutionalised states transitioning from dictatorship to democracy has had 
limited successes in weakly institutionalised states experiencing recurrent 
horizontal conflict. This understanding has led many scholars to argue for an 
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incorporation of economic, social and cultural rights violations,85 corruption,86 
and structural injustices,87 within transitional justice’s ambit.  
In response, many scholars have taken a more limited view based on 
pragmatic considerations. For example, Lars Waldorf has questioned whether a 
broader approach to justice would overburden the field and disappoint awakened 
expectations.88 Certainly this is an important strategic question – does it make 
more sense to focus on the classic paradigmatic transition where international 
effort can make the most gain? However, in circumstances where conflict is 
clearly understood to have significant socio-economic dimensions, it does not 
make sense to ignore them in order to ‘reif[y] historical dichotomies of civil and 
political versus economic and social rights’.89 The same is true for issues of 
structural injustice. While I agree that in the abstract the broadening of 
transitional justice’s agenda may be ‘a worrying trend’,90 for transitional justice 
measures cannot simply be treated as though they were universal policy tools, I 
do not believe that transitional justice should ignore broader questions of justice 
in appropriate circumstances. In fact, the logic of transitional justice may have 
something to add for particular liberal democracies coming to terms with historic 
injustice. Local context is critical and we should not automatically exclude 
potentially relevant mechanisms.91  
This Part is divided into two sections. In the first section I deal with 
challenges to extending transitional justice theory beyond its orthodox form. I 
argue that feasibility concerns, while remaining relevant, are not as pertinent for 
established democracies, and that attempts to limit the logic of transitional justice 
to the paradigmatic form denies its utility to historically victimised peoples in 
liberal democracies. In the second section I offer an approach to including liberal 
democracies within transitional justice. My approach seeks to re-centre 
transitional justice onto its philosophical fundamentals – the struggle for a more 
just social contract. In many respects my approach is not correctly identified as 
expanding the field, but narrowing it. A more concentrated understanding of 
transitional justice conceives of the field not as a toolbox, but as an umbrella. 
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Beneath this umbrella sit particular approaches to mediating between the past, 
present and future. In many cases traditional transitional justice processes may  
be relevant, but – crucially – not in all.92 This conception should guide policy 
makers away from simply applying the same transitional justice measures across 
the globe, and towards designing and implementing sui generis transitional 
justice processes that are appropriate to context.  
 
A   Transitional Justice and Liberal Democracies 
Those who advocate for a constrained notion of transitional justice tend to 
base their argument on either a pragmatic or conceptual basis. First, that 
expanding the concept will overburden the field, weakening its practical ability  
to achieve its goals. And second, that expanding the field will rob it of  
its explanatory power, leaving it conceptually barren as a theoretical project. 
Both of these considerations have merit, though they are not complete  
defences. Feasibility concerns are especially relevant for states transitioning  
from mass conflict or authoritarianism, but they do not hold as much weight for 
liberal democracies with a stable politico-legal foundation.93 Further, containing 
transitional justice to its paradigmatic case denies its conceptual tools to 
historically marginalised peoples in liberal democracies. In many liberal 
democracies, particularly settler states, structural injustices against Indigenous 
peoples are both a product and continuing cause of unjust relations. As a 
theoretical project, transitional justice can assist in rectifying these injustices.94  
The essential concern of all states during a transition is to avoid a relapse into 
conflict or authoritarianism. The state of flux that marks the transition period 
must therefore be managed appropriately. This is a real risk for states 
experiencing a total politico-legal rupture, with evidence suggesting that almost 
half of all countries receiving international peacebuilding assistance relapse into 
conflict within five years, and almost three-quarters of peacebuilding operations 
result in authoritarian regimes.95 The uncertain future of the Arab Spring suggests 
this is an enduring problem. With this in mind, some scholars suggest that 
transitional justice’s backward-looking dimension must be limited in scope: only 
those elements of the past that will not threaten the present and future viability of 
the state can properly be examined, at least at the time of transition.96  
This argument has two limbs, a focus limb and a process limb. Limiting  
the focus of transitional justice measures is said to limit the potential forums  
for conflict and dispute. This idea was adopted in the negotiated transition  
that marked South Africa’s democratisation. The central institutional transitional 
measure, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, had a mandate limited  
to examining gross human rights violations,97  excluding everyday harms and 
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structural injustices perpetuated by apartheid. While the subject of legitimate 
criticism,98 it is unlikely that a broader mandate that examined apartheid itself 
would have been either politically feasible or successful initially. Indeed, the 
focus limb should be thought of as intimately related to the process limb. 
Focused institutions with carefully calibrated (and achievable) mandates can 
build political coalitions for future reform. The success of each measure 
engenders hope and community support for future measures, endowing the entire 
project with ‘the meaning of justice’.99 The protracted transition in Chile is a 
perfect example: the initial prioritisation of truth-telling measures gradually gave 
way to successful criminal prosecutions, achieved without threatening the 
stability of the state. 100  As the Argentine Alfonsín government discovered, 
threatening residual, though entrenched, power structures too early may limit 
possibilities for a complete transition.101 These concerns suggest that a limited 
conception of transitional justice offers the best hope for successful transitions.  
But is this really so? Rather than tend to a narrow aperture, this argument 
suggests that the process of transition is more important than its focus. Certainly 
at the point of rupture a narrow focus should be advocated, lest violence erupt, 
but what of societies not at risk of conflict? While the general relapse-into-
conflict concern remains relevant for established democracies experiencing a 
minor rupture, I do not think that it is as relevant. A minor politico-legal rupture 
is simply unlikely to cause significant and protracted conflict sufficient to 
threaten the security or viability of the state. For example, while the Mabo 
decision caused substantial angst among sectors of the Australian community, the 
public vitriol extended only as far as calls for a constitutional referendum to 
overturn the decision,102 ie, calls for reform within the system. Simply put, while 
the transition needed to be appropriately managed to secure foundations for a just 
future, there was never any danger of an armed uprising. If this is the case, then 
there is no need to exclude the application of transitional justice theory to 
established democracies. The concern is in ensuring that the transitional justice 
measures adopted are appropriate in the particular circumstances. 103  Indeed, 
managing the process of transition remains critical in liberal democracies, but not 
necessarily because of a danger of conflict. Rather, an inappropriately managed 
transition – either too quick, too slow, or only piecemeal and partial – risks 
losing support among constituencies on both sides, ultimately threatening the 
viability of the project itself.  
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The second argument that scholars employ to reason against an expanding 
notion of transitional justice is a conceptual point. As Naomi Roht-Arriaza states, 
‘broadening the scope of what we mean by transitional justice to encompass the 
building of a just as well as peaceful society may make the effort so broad as to 
become meaningless’.104 There is value in ensuring that political concepts are 
well defined. 105  This is particularly true for transitional justice, which faces 
significant practical problems of overburdened expectations and under-delivery. 
This may be a semantic issue. The linkage of the concept to a period of time – 
‘the transition’ – rather than a particular institutional field or mechanism, such as 
peace building, institutional reform, or truth commissions, suggests a 
cannibalisation of alternative justice measures. Rather than seeing the concept as 
a useful, but limited, mechanism, scholars and practitioners are prone to 
mischaracterise it as exhausting all other potentially complementary mechanisms. 
In trying to do too much, transitional justice is overburdened and persistently 
threatens to disappoint awakened expectations. Rather than encompassing 
everything that is good, transitional justice needs to be better integrated into 
broader political, social and economic justice.  
However, as the following section illustrates, a teleological account of 
transitional justice suggests that the building of a just society, or the 
transformation from less just to more just relations,106 is the very essence of the 
field. The application of this concept in diverse contexts will require various 
measures. These measures, be they truth commissions, criminal prosecutions, etc, 
can be thought of as specific institutional applications underneath a transitional 
justice umbrella, rather than some amorphous understanding of transitional 
justice itself. This approach avoids the problematic assumption that undergirds 
paradigmatic transitional justice theory by distinguishing between the goal and 
the measures designed to achieve that goal. For example, if the transition to more 
just relations requires socioeconomic justice, particular sui generis mechanisms 
designed to achieve that goal can be designed and implemented. This approach 
also avoids overburdening particular transitional justice measures with 
responsibilities they may not be designed to execute – a valid critique of scholars 
seeking to constrain the expanding application of transitional justice theory.107  
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B   Transitional Justice for Liberal Democracies 
Despite broad consensus that transitional justice measures are important for 
countries confronting the legacy of mass abuse, the field ‘remains tremendously 
undertheorized’.108 In part, this accounts for the difficulties some scholars have 
with applying the concept to liberal democracies confronting ruptures in their 
politico-legal foundation.109 This is, however, changing. A teleological approach 
to transitional justice distils its fundamental aims and purposes, and distinguishes 
between the concept as a whole (the umbrella) and specific applications of 
transitional justice measures (criminal prosecution, truth-telling, memorialisation, 
etc). This methodology illustrates that the essential features of transitional justice 
are its temporality, aim and process.110  
In short, implicit in the notion of transitional justice is the transformation of 
the social compact from less just to more just relations.111 Formulated in this 
manner, its relevance for liberal democracies founded on legacies of historic (and 
continuing) injustice, is clear. While this notion shares many commonalities with 
concepts of redemptive democratisation, it remains distinctive. As opposed to 
purely forward-looking constitutionalism, the Janus-faced nature of transitional 
justice requires real engagement with the past. This requirement provides a 
‘heightened, epiphenomenal opportunity’ for a state to re-evaluate and re-
establish its politico-legal foundation.112 The entire process may be immediate, or 
prolonged, protracted and ongoing, but it is this temporality, aim and process that 
marks transitional justice.  
That transitional justice is intimately linked to democratisation can be 
deduced fairly readily. A valuable approach is that of Pablo de Greiff, who  
has sought to develop a general theory of transitional justice by abstracting 
particular transitional justice measures. In analysing this issue, de Greiff has 
developed a normative theoretical conception of transitional justice by reference 
to twin mediate and end goals. According to de Greiff, particular measures  
are transitional justice measures if, in the mediate term, they provide recognition 
to victims and foster civic trust, and, if their ultimate aim is to contribute  
to reconciliation and to democratisation.113  In this ‘substantive conception of 
justice’, transitional justice measures are designed to affirm individuals as rights-
holders, not merely eligible, but almost required, to participate in ‘collective 
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problem resolution’.114 This approach emphasises that the actual political support 
of the local community is integral for the legitimacy of the particular measures 
used, as well as for the new normative regime.  
Democratic legitimacy is a frequent refrain in the transitional justice 
literature. 115  Even scholars who seek to reconceptualise the field away from 
liberal democracy-building do so on the basis that they perceive the current 
approach to democratisation as ignoring the interests of the local community. 
Dustin Sharp’s transitional justice as peacebuilding approach argues stridently 
that critical peacebuilding concepts such as ‘popular peace’,116 and the ‘everyday 
peace’,117 which focus on recognising and respecting the interests of ordinary 
individuals, offer the potential of generating local legitimacy.118 Sharp is clear – 
‘peacebuilding’ should not be synonymous with the narrow ‘state-centric liberal 
international peacebuilding paradigm’ that has characterised transitional justice 
to date, but rather reprioritised to focus on ‘the needs of communities and 
individuals’.119  
Implicit in these accounts, and at the heart of transitional justice more 
broadly, lies the notion of democratic citizenship. Transitional justice is a ‘tool of 
social integration’, and a process of ‘strengthening inclusive citizenship’.120 The 
quest for a more just, participatory and inclusive society is not a subsidiary 
goal,121 but the fundamental driving force of the field.122 In this sense ‘transitional 
justice’ is merely another way of asking Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s central 
question: can there ‘be some legitimate and sure rule of administration in the 
civil order?’123 I do not doubt that this essential problem may be more relevant to 
states transitioning from authoritarianism or mass conflict, but it is not only 
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Hackett Publishing, 2nd ed, 2011) 156 [trans of: Du contrat social ou principes du droit politique (first 
published 1762)] (Bk I).  
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relevant to such states. Minority groups in established liberal democracies often 
experience structural injustice such that they and their interests are frozen out of 
political power.124 This is particularly so for settler states and their relationship 
with their Indigenous peoples. As Albert Memmi has noted, a coloniser’s identity 
‘is essentially that of a usurper’ and ‘colonizers are constantly concerned with 
trying to legitimate their usurpation’.125 The result is an institutional governance 
structure that favours the coloniser at the total expense of the colonised. This 
‘cultural logic’ remains static beneath its ‘changing operational modalities’.126  
In these circumstances, what accounts for Indigenous peoples’ support of the 
social contract? By what right does the state justify its exercise of political 
authority? It is a disavowal or repudiation to this question that motivates claims 
for external self-determination, though absent a total politico-legal rupture, the 
success of such claims is unlikely. In that absence, appeals to self-interest,127 
utility,128 or some combination of both,129 are also unlikely to ground legitimacy. 
What is required is a process of ‘belated state-building’130 whereby the politico-
legal foundations of the nation are made more (democratically) legitimate, such 
that free and equal citizens may be reasonably expected to endorse the new 
regime131 – that is, where conditions for their consent have been realised.132 As 
Ruti Teitel notes, transitional justice is the means by which this can occur: a state 
can ‘reconstitute the collective across racial, ethnic, and religious lines’, and 
legitimate itself ‘in a contingent political identity’.133 This involves endowing 
transitional justice measures ‘with the meaning of justice initiatives’.134 That is, 
making sure that these measures are mutually reinforcing, enjoy political support, 
and convince the marginalised that circumstances are changing. Individuals 
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must be normatively affirmed as human beings of moral worth, whose interests 
will be taken into account in decision-making.135  
This conception of transitional justice more accurately covers its disparate 
employment across the globe. The early South American transitions, as well as 
those in Eastern Europe and South Africa, involved a process of democratisation, 
where the unjust constitutional order of the old regime was repealed. In its place, 
more substantive democratic orders were developed.136 The same is true for non-
paradigmatic transitional societies. In Northern Ireland, the Good Friday 
Agreement specifically involved the creation of a new consociational democratic 
order aimed at ‘enhanc[ing] political and legal inclusiveness’.137 Set along three 
‘strands’, this included: a devolved Assembly with mandatory cross-community 
voting and a power-sharing executive; as well as North–South confederal 
dimensions (between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland), and East–
West confederal aspects (between Ireland and the United Kingdom).138  
Two recent approaches have explored how a social contract conceptualisation 
has relevance for settler states confronting issues of historic injustice meted out 
to their Indigenous peoples. Stephen Winter explicitly grounds his theory of 
transitional justice in a liberal political philosophy. Drawing on Teitel’s 
understanding of transition as ‘a normative shift in the principles underlying  
and legitimating the exercise of state power’,139 Winter characterises transitional 
justice as a process of transformation in legitimating regimes, that is, a 
transformation in the state’s justification for the exercise of political authority.140 
Jennifer Balint, Julie Evans and Nesam McMillan adopt a similar conception, re-
imagining transitional justice as a transition ‘from unjust relations to just 
relations’.141 The value in these related approaches is in abstracting the concept of 
transitional justice away from its paradigmatic form and the problematic 
assumptions that undergird it. Both approaches more naturally include situations 
such as Northern Ireland’s Good Friday Agreement and New Zealand’s Treaty of 
Waitangi process, by teasing out the implicit social contract emphasis within 
transitional justice.  
This process of transformation or ‘deepening of substantive democracy’142 
can still appropriately be characterised as ‘transitional justice’, rather than as  
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part of a broader project of democratisation or constitutional redemption, if the  
Janus-faced dimension of transitional justice is emphasised. Indeed, any 
successful transitional justice process requires both backward- and forward-
looking elements. 143  Looking backwards, measures must promote recognition  
and acknowledgment within the public sphere of a past characterised by 
wrongdoing.144  Looking forward, this acknowledgment must be supported by 
public and political commitment to reparative action. 145  For example, the 
payment of reparations as a mechanism of transitional justice may begin from the 
point of corrective justice, but it is also expected to pursue more forward-looking 
goals encompassing the ‘felt justice needs’ of victims.146 In terms of land reform, 
transitional justice might caution against mere restitution, recognising that 
monetary compensation as well as recognition and avenues to participate in 
decision-making are also necessary to embed substantive normative change. As 
will be explored in Part IV, the broader approaches to land reform developed 
outside the NTA process appreciate this necessity.  
Constitutional redemption, on the other hand, is merely a forward-looking 
project.147 While the existence of an interim constitution is directly related to past 
illegitimate or unjust exercises of governmental authority, its aim is to establish 
the conditions for a just future. It does not necessarily examine or confront issues 
of corrective justice, and it certainty does not do so in any holistic or 
comprehensive manner. The great significance of transitional justice is its direct 
emphasis on mediating between the past, present and future. It recognises a 
fundamental idea – that dealing with the past is important, but that doing so is 
important for forward-looking reasons. Transitional justice understands that it is 
difficult, if not impossible, for people to believe that they are part of a shared 
common political project when their rights have been violated in a disdainful or 
contemptuous manner.148 Land reform in Australia has not before been explicitly 
conceived as a mechanism of transitional justice, but there is no reason that it 
should not be. In acknowledging the wrongs of dispossession and sowing the 
conditions for a just and equitable future, land reform – when done right – bears 
Janus’ face.  
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IV   TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND LAND REFORM 
If transitional justice can be understood as a process of deepening substantive 
democracy or of transforming unjust relations into just relations, its logic  
has relevance for established liberal democracies founded on legacies of  
historic injustice. Some scholars have recognised this, and have examined 
particular institutional mechanisms designed to further reconciliation between 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians under essentially transitional justice 
frameworks. The two most relevant processes are the seminal 1997 Bringing 
Them Home Report on the Stolen Generations,149 and the Rudd Government’s 
2008 Apology.150 Of course, commissions of inquiry and official apologies are 
more readily subsumed within a transitional justice discourse: ‘Both are intended 
to represent a step forward in inter-group relations by marking an end-point to a 
history of wrongdoing and allowing political and social relations to start anew’.151 
Although the process of land reform is also clearly connected to transitional 
justice, it is only in the last few years that scholars have begun to analyse settler-
colonial relations more broadly through this framework.152 In this Part, I explore 
Mabo and the development of native title as a process of transitional justice. This 
study emphasises that despite positive steps, the transition remains incomplete.  
  
A   Mabo and Substantive Normative Change 
Instrumentally, exercise of control over defined territory is a prerequisite for 
statehood,153 but land also plays a symbolic foundational role in the mythology of 
nation-building. For settler colonies, whose very existence is founded on 
dispossession, this creates difficulties.154 It is important to note that these are not 
necessarily merely minor political difficulties but potentially significant politico-
legal ruptures; for example, the extremely unequal land holding facing the new 
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regime in Zimbabwe was not managed appropriately and led to a complete 
disintegration of its legitimacy.155 In contradistinction, the careful recalibrating of 
a settler colony’s legal and symbolic foundations can be understood as a minor 
but not inconsequential rupture. When they emerge, these delicate fissures 
provide an opportunity for a settler colony to revisit its foundational narratives 
and embark upon a process towards more just relations with its Indigenous 
peoples.  
Australia has been comparatively slow to engage in this process. In the 
United States, as early as 1823, the Supreme Court recognised the inherent 
sovereignty of Native American tribes.156 While this sovereignty is limited157 and 
defeasible by congressional action,158 it persists until and unless extinguished by 
Congress. In Canada, the Supreme Court held in 1973 that aboriginal title to land 
existed prior to colonisation and was not merely derived from statutory law,159 a 
recognition that was subsequently constitutionalised.160 In New Zealand, although 
once declared a ‘simple nullity’,161 the Treaty of Waitangi has begun to take on 
increasing moral, if not legal importance. Described variously as ‘part of the 
fabric of New Zealand society’,162 and ‘of the greatest constitutional importance 
to New Zealand’,163  the Treaty does not impose fiduciary obligations on the 
Crown,164 but remains ‘the foundation for the future relationship between the 
Crown and the Maori race’.165 In Australia, absent the signing of any treaties, it 
was assumed that upon the British Crown’s acquisition of sovereignty in 1788 no 
Indigenous law, customs or rights, including interests in land, survived. 166 
Though in 1979, the High Court indicated that this question was not completely 
settled,167 it was not until Mabo that the Court took the question head-on.  
The persistent failure of the common law to recognise Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander land rights was ameliorated to some effect by political action.168 
Beginning in 1966, a number of dramatic individual settlements were reached 
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between Indigenous peoples and the Commonwealth, or various states. 169 
Although some of these settlements delivered expansive rights, most notably the 
Pitjantjatjara Agreement which provided direct grants of inalienable freehold 
land,170 many were ‘much more limited in scope’.171 However, absent any legally 
enforceable right to land, these settlements remained essentially ad hoc, limited 
in utility for other Indigenous peoples, and predicated on a supportive political 
environment. Indeed, Western Australia failed to make any agreement during this 
period. Clearly an inequity existed.  
Here then, the High Court faced a rule of law dilemma similar to those faced 
by states experiencing paradigmatic transitions, but with one important caveat – 
there was no total politico-legal rupture. Yet, despite this absence, the case still 
prompted the fundamental question facing all transitioning states: ‘to what extent 
does bringing the ancien régime172 to trial, imply an inherent conflict between 
predecessor and successor visions of justice?’173 Absent a complete rupture, the 
Court needed to reconcile past discriminatory and violent practices with 
contemporary mores, all within an unbroken and continuous legal system. The 
solution adopted by the Court strides the positions sketched out by H L A Hart 
and Lon L Fuller in their debate on legality and Nazi law.174  
The difficulty facing the Court concerned the conception of what the rule of 
law requires in times of transition or transformation. Must, as Hart argued, the 
antecedent law, which served to dispossess Indigenous Australians of their land, 
be recognised and accepted as valid?175 Or, in seeking to straddle the balance 
between restoring respect for law and respect for justice,176 should the Court err 
on the side of contemporary values? Justice Brennan neatly summarised this 
puzzle:  
In discharging its duty to declare the common law of Australia, this Court is not 
free to adopt rules that accord with contemporary notions of justice and human 
rights if their adoption would fracture the skeleton of principle which gives the 
body of our law its shape and internal consistency.177 
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As is well known, the Court found a way to mediate this path, holding that 
the common law recognised and protected the rights of Indigenous peoples to 
their traditional lands, in accordance with their laws and customs. By 
distinguishing between the Crown’s acquisition of sovereignty and the Crown’s 
ownership of land in the colony, the Court could hold that the Crown acquired 
only radical title, not absolute beneficial title. This created the conceptual space 
for the Court to then hold that pre-existing rights and interests in land could have 
survived the acquisition of sovereignty. Native title thus exists as a burden on the 
Crown’s radical title.178 But how did the Court get here?  
Teitel has remarked that in periods of political flux, ‘international law offers 
a useful mediating concept’, between the antinomies of positivism and natural 
law.179 Though grounded in positive law, international law incorporates ‘values of 
justice associated with natural law’, preserving the ordinary understanding of the 
rule of law as stable and settled, but creating space for transformation.180 Though 
Teitel had in mind trials in post-communist Hungary, aspects of international and 
comparative law served an important role in Australia’s normative shift.  
Indeed, the solution to the Courts’ dilemma was the invocation of the 
international law concept of terra nullius. Critical analyses of Mabo have teased 
out the inherent tension within the leading judgments – the ‘rejected’ doctrine of 
terra nullius was never justified as the legal basis to dispossess Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander peoples,181 and was irrelevant to the question at issue,182 as 
neither the categorisation of Australia as a ‘settled’ colony,183  nor Australian 
sovereignty itself, was directly challenged.184 But if this was the case, then what 
was the point of invoking terra nullius? As Gerry Simpson notes, the Court 
employed the concept as an integral element in a ‘symbolic legitimation ritual’:185  
With the domestic legal tradition so clearly at odds with political and historical 
requirements, what was required was a system of law or a different legal history 
that could enter the discourse and domesticate or legitimate a decision that might 
otherwise have been seen as excessively political.186 
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The refutation of the doctrine served two purposes. It brought Australian law 
into conformity with contemporary notions of justice, while reinforcing the very 
legal system and society that had acted to dispossess Indigenous Australians.187 
Far from a ‘judicial revolution’, Mabo was a ‘cautious correction’ that included 
significant reassurances for non-Indigenous Australians, and would likely have 
limited impact on existing titles and land use.188 Through the concept of terra 
nullius, the Court could mediate the relationship between the former and 
successor legal regimes, without sacrificing stability, or threatening a true 
political transformation.189  
Comparative law provided further steadying reassurances. Reference to 
decisions of Canadian, United States and New Zealand courts buttressed the 
majority opinions.190 Rather than understand this as merely traditional common 
law methodology, under a transitional justice lens we see the Court searching for 
valid referent points it could use to justify, in moral, political, and legal terms, 
the transformative impact of its decision. These three states are not just common 
law jurisdictions but settler colonies that had and continue to share similar 
experiences. Native title may have been a radical concept domestically, but it had 
already been recognised in comparable countries – even during the moment of 
transition, when law is at its most unsettled, it is paradoxically law that offers 
permanence.  
But law does not merely reflect community values; it constructs them.191 As 
Robert van Krieken notes, ‘when the High Court asserts that it is responding to 
“the contemporary values of the Australian people”, it is in fact choosing to  
play an active role in the construction of those values’.192 In this respect, the 
‘unusually emotive’193  language of the decision plays an important role. The 
majority is explicit: ‘judged by any civilized standard’, Indigenous dispossession 
‘is unjust’,194 and ‘unacceptable in our society’,195 constituting ‘the darkest aspect 
of the history of this nation’,196 and leaving a ‘national legacy of unutterable 
shame’.197 The majority’s emphasis on coming to terms with the past goes well 
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beyond mere formal acknowledgment, delving into a ‘jurisprudence of regret’.198 
The striking language affirmed by Australia’s highest court plays distinct  
roles for two audiences. For Indigenous Australians it has a semantic  
dimension, articulating norms and values that endow the decision with ‘the 
meaning of justice’.199 But talk is cheap. It is the application of the decision 
across the entire continent, rather than merely to the Murray Islands, that ensures 
this strident language is endowed with the meaning of justice. For non-
Indigenous Australians the language has a didactic function, contributing to the 
‘epistemological and interpretative changes necessary to comprehend 
transition’.200 In clear and unambiguous terms, it explains the magnitude of the 
discrimination. This is key as it helps propagate moral capital – a critical element 
in securing any transition.  
Moral capital is ‘the capacity to persuade’.201 Moral and political leaders have 
a limited quotient of moral capital they can expend on particular projects. In this 
sense, moral capital is analogous to a political mandate. Just as a democratically 
elected government claims a mandate from the people to implement certain 
policies, at the moment of transition, the new regime has an enormous reserve of 
moral capital.202 Although not a complete rupture, Mabo ‘marked the beginning 
of new national insight’, 203  with the majority’s condemnation of the prior 
justification for dispossession denoting ‘the now repugnant regime as the start 
point of the relevant transitional process’. 204  The then Prime Minister Paul 
Keating immediately recognised this fact, lauding it as ‘a milestone decision’, 
which ‘gives Australia a tremendous opportunity to get its relationship with the 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people right’.205 Putting to one side for a 
moment the very real limitations of the NTA, the Mabo decision was the key 
catalyst in the successful enactment of native title legislation.206  
Transitional moments are, by their nature, compromises. But of course, 
compromises can be both principled and unprincipled. Justice can be recognised 
and respected as an important value within transitional measures, or it can be 
traded off for ‘narrow, prudential concerns’.207 The line may be blurred, but a 
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principled compromise entails and has the potential to generate more legitimacy 
than a mere concession to expedience.208 Mabo was a compromise, but it was a 
principled and pragmatic one that sought to enable ‘the interests of all parties to 
be substantially met’.209 If stability was the Court’s overriding goal, it could have 
limited its application to Murray Islands; if corrective justice was the Court’s 
principal aim it could have questioned the normative foundation of Australian 
sovereignty. Both stability and justice are recognisable values, and both make a 
claim on people’s allegiance in situations of transition.210 Balancing these values 
and mediating the past, present and the future is a distinctive feature of all 
transitional justice strategies. But Mabo was just the beginning; and quickly the 
NTA took on significant importance, for it would frame the future relationship.  
 
B   Land and Negotiated Transitions 
As Ronald Cass has remarked in relation to land reform in Zimbabwe, 
‘claims for redress of historic grievances are unusual and stretch the bounds  
of legal systems’. 211  In settler colonies, whose very existence is founded on 
dispossession, this is all the more true – and yet, in the absence of a  
complete politico-legal breakdown, total land reform is both impossible and 
ethically suspect.212 But transitional justice does have work to do here. Under the 
transitional justice umbrella sit particular sui generis mechanisms designed to 
transform the relationship between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians. 
This section will explore the impact of the NTA, as well as broader non-native 
title agreements, under an explicitly transitional justice lens. It finds that 
comprehensive and mutually reinforcing processes offer the best prospect for an 
equitable future.  
 
1 The Native Title Act  
In paradigmatic contexts, Bruce Ackerman argues that moral capital must be 
carefully managed in order to safeguard the transition: too heavy an emphasis on 
backward-looking corrective justice at the expense of forward-looking 
constitutionalism may ‘squander moral capital in an ineffective effort to right 
past wrongs’.213 The negotiation surrounding the NTA treads this tension, with the 
government seeking to mediate conservative and Indigenous interests into a 
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workable foundation for future cooperation.214  In addition to recognising and 
protecting native title, the NTA sought to: regulate future dealings affecting 
native title; validate past acts that had been invalidated because of the existence 
of native title; and, provide for the determination of native title and establish the 
National Native Title Tribunal (‘NNTT’) as a means to deal with those claims.215 
Like any negotiated transition, the new regime was not built on the bones of the 
old, but through compromise.216  
However, two subsequent events dramatically shifted the dynamics. The 
1996 election of the Howard Government brought to power many individuals 
who had argued that Mabo had been wrongly decided,217 and had voted against 
the NTA. While the High Court’s intervention in Wik Peoples v Queensland,218 
which declared that native title could co-exist with pastoral leases, significantly 
extending its reach, caused further disquiet among conservative interests. Though 
Mabo and the NTA were not radically transformative, they threatened established 
power structures within Australia. Those power structures retaliated in 1998 with 
the ‘10 Point Plan’219 and the Native Title Amendment Act 1998 (Cth). While this 
incorporated significant amendments to the NNTT, and increased flexibility in 
native title claims by introducing Indigenous Land Use Agreements (‘ILUAs’) – 
a creative mechanism that provided for voluntary, flexible and pragmatic 
settlements – it was specifically intended to deliver ‘bucket loads of 
                                                 
214  See Rowse, above n 205; Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 16 
November 1993, 2878 (Paul Keating, Prime Minister of Australia); Tehan, above n 168, 538–51.  
215  NTA s 3.  
216  See Paul Keating, ‘Speech by the Prime Minister’ (Speech delivered at the NSW Labor Party State 
Conference, Sydney, 13 June 1993): ‘Aboriginal Australians [will be given] justice but … in a way that 
[not only] keeps the country cohesive’ but actually moves us ‘closer to a united Australia’: 
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 16 November 1993, 2883 (Paul 
Keating). On whether the NTA was a fair compromise, see Giselle Byrnes and David Ritter, ‘Antipodean 
Settler Societies and their Complexities: The Waitangi Process in New Zealand and Native Title and the 
Stolen Generations in Australia’ (2008) 46 Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 54, 59.  
217  Patrick Emerton and Jeffrey Goldsworthy, ‘The Brennan Court’ in Rosalind Dixon and George Williams 
(eds), The High Court, the Constitution and Australian Politics (Cambridge University Press, 2015) 261, 
270. 
218  (1996) 187 CLR 1. 
219  ‘The Federal Government’s 10 Point Response to Wik’ (1997) 4(2) Indigenous Law Bulletin 12. 
542 UNSW Law Journal Volume 39(2) 
extinguishment’.220 Judicial interpretation has since narrowed the operation of the 
NTA even further.221  
Transitional justice theory suggests that in these early years the transition 
experienced difficulties. Scholars and practitioners acknowledge that to be 
effective transitional justice measures must be comprehensive and mutually 
reinforcing. This requirement serves twin goals: instrumentally it narrows the 
scope of each particular mechanism increasing the likelihood of each achieving 
success; symbolically it demonstrates the state’s commitment to change, imbuing 
the entire enterprise with the meaning of justice and bringing with it the potential 
to renew and grow moral capital. The narrowing of the NTA by both Parliament 
and the High Court dissipated much of the initial goodwill and caused 
Indigenous Australians to question the state’s commitment to the transition.222 
However, the problems run deeper than this. Recognising that dispossession 
meant that many Indigenous Australians would be ‘unable to assert native title 
rights and interests’,223 the NTA was originally intended to be one element of a 
broader package. While the Special Fund for land acquisition has been enacted,224 
a promised social justice package has yet to eventuate. The continuing failure to 
enact this third limb places extra stress on the NTA,225 destabilises its potential as 
an element of a substantive normative change, and degrades the transition of 
symbolic and practical justice.  
Not all transitions are the same. Samuel Huntington’s typology of transitions 
distinguishes between: ‘transplacements’ (negotiated transitions between 
government and opposition elites); ‘transformations’ (where ruling elites lead the 
transition); ‘replacements’ (where opposition groups lead the process); and 
‘interventions’ (where democratic institutions are imposed by external forces).226 
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Notwithstanding the changed dynamics, the enactment of the NTA most 
accurately reflects Huntington’s transplacement model. First, dominant groups 
within government and Indigenous organisations recognised that neither had the 
respective moral or political force to determine the future regime unilaterally.227 
And second, within their own constituencies, reformers inside government  
and moderate Indigenous voices commanded more political support than 
extremists.228  
Like the political negotiations that formed the NTA, the NTA itself privileges 
conciliation rather than litigation.229 While all applications for a ‘determination of 
native title’ are initially commenced as proceedings in the Federal Court,230 the 
Court practises an intensive case management scheme to identify points of 
agreement, and to refer particular issues to mediation. 231  The push towards 
conciliation has generally been successful.232 As of 1 June 2016, 352 native title 
determinations have been made. Of these, 276 were by consent, 40 were litigated, 
and 36 were unopposed. 233  In many respects, the focus on mediation and 
conciliation is similar to the paradigmatic transition towards more just 
relations,234 with the NNTT and the Federal Court operating as sites for a series 
of individualised negotiated transitions across the country. To some extent  
all forms of mediation may bear similarities to negotiated transitions – both  
are intended to provide a more sustainable foundation for future cooperation 
between the parties.235 Mediation under the NTA, however, is sufficiently distinct 
from more ordinary forms of mediation,236 that its similarities with Huntington’s 
transplacements may be fruitfully analysed.  
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To begin with, formally, while most mediation involves only two parties who 
have an existing relationship, native title proceedings can involve hundreds of 
parties. Determination of native title operates as a judgment in rem; therefore  
it is important that all parties ‘who hold or wish to assert a claim or interest in 
respect of the defined area of land’ are represented.237 Aside from increasing the 
complexity of any settlement, the multiplicity of parties, interests and approaches 
mirrors the initially complicated stages of negotiated political transitions. 238 
Questions about whose or what interests should be represented, what each 
participating party’s aspirations are, and finalising areas of common ground are 
exceedingly difficult. It is disappointing but not surprising that proceedings under 
the NTA can take several years, or more.239 In August 2014, the Gumbaynggirr 
People were finally successful in finalising a consent determination that had 
taken 17 years.240  
The number of participants or interests that need to be represented in each 
negotiation belies a further distinction with ‘ordinary’ mediation. While most 
mediation is built upon solid bedrock of shared understanding or awareness of 
issues, native title mediation ‘involves an attempt to understand and reconcile 
culturally different (and divergent) views of land and waters’. 241  Many non-
Indigenous Australians have difficulty conceptualising Indigenous Australians’ 
relationship to country and its role as the basis of cultural, spiritual and personal 
identity. Dispossession of land can have traumatic consequences for Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islanders, including ‘loss of personal identity’.242 This radical 
disconnect between participants is more pronounced than, but shares similarities 
with, paradigmatic transitions where the normative conception of the state is at 
issue.  
Of course, native title mediation is not completely analogous to Huntington’s 
transplacements. For example, the framework within which mediation under the 
NTA occurs is distinct from that of political transitions. Ordinarily, dictatorial or 
authoritarian states are only compelled to the negotiating table by the sustained 
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moral and political pressure of opposition groups. As noted above, prior to Mabo, 
this was the only option for Indigenous peoples to press their claims.243 Though 
some groups were at times successful, comprehensive reform was unavailable. 
Since Mabo and the NTA, claims for land reform have been raised within a legal 
framework. This is significant, for it ensures that a resolution will occur. For 
political transitions on the other hand, there is simply no guarantee that talk will 
result in a settlement, and at times, the possibility that negotiations may collapse 
and the parties relapse into actual or threatened conflict is high.244 The presence 
of a secure legal framework in the native title context essentially forces all sides 
to the negotiating table.  
For this phenomenon to operate effectively the law must be both clear and 
certain. As the Australian Law Reform Commission has noted, uncertainty over 
the requirements of the NTA led to a number of test cases and only a relatively 
small number of determinations (45 determinations) in its first 10 years. 
Confidence in the NTA, as well as developing skill and expertise among 
practitioners, led to dramatic increase in determinations over the second 10-year 
period (223 determinations).245 
However, the existence of a legal framework is not an unconditional good. 
Mediation presents itself as neutral. Yet, this neutrality is generally only of a 
formal sense, in that a mediator aims to ensure equality of process, rather  
than counter substantive inequalities of power.246 Similarly to the position of 
opposition groups in transplacements, Indigenous Australians seeking to claim 
native title find that the process is structured against their interests.247 To prove 
native title, Indigenous applicants must show that they possess rights or interests 
to land or waters under and by virtue of traditional laws and customs they 
acknowledge and observe.248 The traditional laws and customs must amount to a 
normative system, have existed before the assertion of British sovereignty and 
have continued ‘substantially uninterrupted’ since sovereignty.249 While lack of 
physical presence does not necessarily defeat a claim,250 the history of widespread 
dispossession across Australia and courts’ privileging of documentary 
evidence,251 to say nothing of resource imbalances between state and territory 
governments and Indigenous claimants, make connection difficult to prove. 
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Further, native title must be consistent with rights or interests already granted 
under the common law.252 
The NTA does provide a legal structure for Indigenous Australians to assert 
their rights, but the statutory imbalances are not without consequences. The 
increasingly complex, technical and legalistic procedures for determining claims 
has ‘constrained’253 its potentially transformative role. No doubt the absence of a 
total politico-legal rupture in Australia is a significant cause of this failure. In 
managing the transition, the NTA robbed calls for meaningful land reform of 
political salience. In this context, calls for a fundamental re-think of the approach 
to land reform have been made;254 in particular, there is a push towards non-
native title settlements and broader settlement agreements. The logic of 
transitional justice suggests that complementary approaches will assist in 
ensuring a meaningful transition. 
 
2 Broader Approaches to Land Reform 
The NTA may be the most well-known, but it is not the only transitional 
process aimed at securing land justice. A number of complimentary mechanisms 
conferring varying levels of rights have been developed. In keeping with the 
model of transitional justice as an umbrella, these broader approaches to land 
reform can be seen as particular sui generis processes aimed at transforming the 
relationship between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians towards more 
just relations. While these processes offer potential individually, it is as a 
mutually reinforcing and collective enterprise that they offer the best prospect for 
an equitable future. 
A recent non-native title example is the Traditional Owner Settlement  
Act 2010 (Vic) (‘TOSA’). Designed ‘to advance reconciliation and promote  
good relations’ between the state and Indigenous Australians, 255  the TOSA 
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enables Victorian traditional owners to pursue a negotiated ‘recognition and 
settlement agreement’256 directly with the state government outside the native title 
determination process. The overarching settlement agreement may include four 
sub-agreements relating to: land, land-use, funding, and natural resources.257 The 
express inclusion of the power to make funding agreements is particularly 
important as it recognises that although land is a necessary condition for self-
determination, it is not by itself sufficient – economic development is critical to 
securing an equitable future. These agreements are registered as ILUAs under the 
NTA, 258  and are therefore legally binding. For many Indigenous groups the 
breadth of the available outcomes is appealing. For example, the 2013 settlement 
package between the Dja Dja Wurrung and the Victorian government included: 
transfer of two historically and culturally significant freehold properties; transfer 
of six parks and reserves as ‘Aboriginal title’ and joint management of those 
lands; acknowledgement of past injustices; hunting, fishing and gathering rights; 
as well as almost $10 million in funding by the state for investment in economic 
development initiatives chosen by the Dja Dja Wurrung.259 Although the TOSA 
has only operated for a number of years it has been praised by the Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner as setting ‘the benchmark for 
other states to meet when resolving native title claims’.260  
One of the measures within the Dja Dja Wurrung settlement is joint 
management of land and resources. If conducted on a firm basis of formal 
recognition and active participation in decision-making processes, collaborative 
land and resource management strategies can empower local communities. 261 
These processes also have the potential to break down the disjunction between 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous cultural norms, providing an opportunity for 
‘cross-cultural development of management processes and conflict resolution’.262 
In assisting the construction of a shared understanding, and affirming the 
normative agency of Indigenous Australians, joint management can serve as an 
appropriate mechanism in Australia’s continuing transition.  
Joint management has evolved out of environmental conservation.  
Upon ratifying the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity, 263  the Australia 
government began to develop the National Reserve System, a network of 
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protected areas across the country. 264  In conjunction with this project, the 
government introduced the concept of ‘Indigenous Protected Areas’ (‘IPAs’). 
IPAs are established by a voluntary declaration by traditional owners with the 
aim of increasing Indigenous control in management and decision-making over 
land, as well as recognising its cultural, spiritual and economic significance. 
Today there are 67 IPAs constituting 40 per cent of the total protected area under 
the National Reserve System and 7 per cent of the entire country.265 Evidence 
suggests that Indigenous control at the outset of the process, ‘rather than 
government conservation agencies making a “space” for Indigenous 
involvement’ is critical to ensuring positive outcomes in terms of empowerment, 
equity and social justice.266 Although not conceived of as a transitional justice 
measure, the process of self-determination and norm-affirmation inherent in the 
declaration and management of IPAs serves transitional justice goals. 
IPAs are not the only forum for joint management. The Kakadu National 
Park model serves as another example of successful cooperation.267 In Kakadu, 
land owned by the Bininj and Mungguy is leased to the state for the purpose of 
the national park, which is overseen by a board of management composed of a 
majority who represent traditional owners.268 Although the Bininj and Mungguy 
own only about 50 per cent of Kakadu National Park, the entire Park is managed 
as if it was all Aboriginal land:269 traditional owners continue to exercise their 
hunting, fishing and gathering rights and are integral in developing conservation 
and management strategies. 270  If not designed appropriately, the explicitly 
conservationist framing inherent in some joint management programs can 
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267  Javier Beltrán (ed), ‘Indigenous and Traditional Peoples and Protected Areas: Principles, Guidelines and 
Case Studies’ (Best Practice Protected Area Guidelines Series No 4, World Commission on Protected 
Areas, 2000) 132. 
268  Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) ss 374–83; Department of the 
Environment (Cth), ‘Kakadu Board of Management’ (18 February 2013) <http://laptop.deh.gov.au/ 
parks/kakadu/management/board-management.html>. 
269  Director of National Parks, ‘Kakadu National Park Management Plan 2016–2026: A Living Cultural 
Landscape’ (Management Plan, Department of the Environment (Cth), 2016) 16 
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files/kakadu-management-plan-2016-2026.pdf>. 
270  Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) ss 303BAA, 359A. 
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potentially conflict with Indigenous rights, particularly to development. 271  As 
with the Kakadu and Dja Dja Wurrung approaches, joint management should be 
conceived of as merely part of the whole – transitional justice theory indicates 
that land security, Indigenous governance structures, and the capacity for future 
cultural and economic development, are critical to the success of any joint 
management system.272 The 2016–2026 Management Plan for Kakadu National 
Park recognises this fact; in contemplating the success of cooperation so far it 
outlines future priorities, including increasing Indigenous business 
opportunities.273  
The growth of broader approaches to land reform within Australia is 
encouraging. As the National Native Title Council has advocated, native title 
needs to be seen as a ‘means to an end, not an end in itself’.274 Refocusing on the 
goals that the NTA was intended to deliver – recognition of Indigenous peoples, 
redressing disadvantage, and establishing the conditions for relational self-
determination – suggests that broader land settlement frameworks, including 
governance rights, has considerable merit. In recognising and affirming 
Indigenous peoples as rights holders and negotiating on a nation-to-nation basis, 
creative use of broader land settlements has the potential to both foster civic trust 
and contribute to meaningful reconciliation. When situated within a holistic, 
comprehensive and mutually reinforcing package of measures, these approaches 
are likely to have positive outcomes in transforming relations in Australia.275  
Recognition that participation, consultation and consent are integral to 
achieving positive outcomes for Indigenous Australians in relation to land 
management and ownership, makes Australia’s posture at international law 
perplexing. Australia’s continuing refusal to ratify ILO Convention 169276 and 
our belated support for the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples277 belies our acceptance of the principles that these soft-law 
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272  Langton, Palmer and Ma Rhea, above n 266, 84; Lawrence, above n 262. 
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274  See National Native Title Council, Submission No 16 to Australian Law Reform Commission, Review of 
the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), 19 January 2015, 2. See also Sean Brennan et al, ‘The Idea of Native 
Title as a Vehicle for Change and Indigenous Empowerment’ in Sean Brennan et al (eds), Native Title 
from Mabo to Akiba: A Vehicle for Change and Empowerment? (Federation Press, 2015) 2, 2: ‘native 
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instruments affirm. These instruments provide an ‘important framework’ for the 
Australian state to ‘re-engage Indigenous communities’ in relation to land 
reform.278 Just as importantly from a transitional justice perspective, the symbolic 
and expressive value in engaging constructively with these mechanisms can 
imbue the entire land reform enterprise with the meaning of justice. For non-
Indigenous Australians it has ‘important educative value’, explaining the 
relational concept of self-determination; 279  for Indigenous Australians it can 
demonstrate that the Australian state intends to meaningfully engage in a process 
of transition.  
 
V   CONCLUSION 
The negotiated transitions occurring within and across Australia today share 
elements with paradigmatic transitions. The process may be more protracted, but 
it is no less conflicted. Similarly with more orthodox transitions, particular 
measures do not always clearly move from less just to more just relations,280 and 
even Mabo may be understood as not causing a minor normative rupture, but 
rather continuing the ‘process of denying or containing Indigenous 
sovereignty’.281 While Mabo transformed Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
peoples’ agitation for inclusion in Australian property law from moral claims into 
legal rights, they remained (and remain) very much the weaker partner.282 This 
political weakness has translated into a native title claims process that reflects 
this imbalance, constraining the transformative potential of the NTA as a 
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(Report, Human Rights Center, University of California Berkeley, 2011). The latter survey found that 
while trust in the judicial sector has increased, perception of corruption and impunity among elites has 
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Law Journal 826, 835–6. 
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mechanism of transitional justice. However, creative approaches to land reform 
have been, and are continuing to be, developed. This is positive.  
More broadly, the contemporary push for constitutional recognition of 
Indigenous Australians can be conceived of as another sui generis mechanism 
underneath Australia’s transitional justice umbrella. Recognition offers a 
‘heightened, epiphenomenal opportunity’ for the Australian state to re-evaluate 
and re-establish its politico-legal foundation.283 This framing suggests that trading 
away substantive recognition for narrow prudential concerns, as suggested by 
some commentators,284 will achieve neither practical reconciliation nor symbolic 
legitimacy. The utility of a transitional justice lens is in the understanding that 
any transition must be comprehensive, holistic and mutually reinforcing; 
constitutional recognition must aim at recognising Indigenous Australians, 
fostering civic trust, and contributing to a more just social contract.285 ‘After 
many years of isolation and exclusion’ Indigenous Australians must feel as 
though the Constitution belongs to them.286 Ad hoc and partial mechanisms are 
rarely successful.  
Constitutional recognition is an important process of the transition, but it 
should not be seen as the only process. Just like the 1967 referendum,287 and 
Mabo, substantive constitutional recognition is only a threshold change; 
something must be done with the considerable moral capital that it will 
propagate. There are many candidates, including: enactment of the long-delayed 
social justice package providing compensation for dispossession; reform of the 
NTA to revitalise the promise of Mabo; 288  and extension of comprehensive 
settlements conducted on a nation-to-nation level. If adopted, these three 
proposals would assist in continuing and confirming the transition, holistically 
transcending each individual reform’s strictures. If implemented and managed 
effectively, transitional justice indicates that this project can increase rather than 
dissipate moral capital. Indeed, as Indigenous responses to the Victorian 
government’s recent decision to begin formal negotiations towards a treaty 
indicate, 289  appropriate individual steps do imbue the entire process with the 
meaning of justice.  
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Nevertheless, this requires strong political commitment and real will within 
the non-Indigenous Australian community towards enacting beneficial legislation 
and removing structural injustices that mar Indigenous participation and self-
determination in the nation. The ultimate goal – and one I believe is achievable – 
is the restructure or reorientation of Australia’s political institutions to ensure that 
the interests and values of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples are taken 
into account at all stages of the processes of government. That is, that Indigenous 
Australians are treated with the dignity and respect that they deserve. 290 
Indigenising Australia’s political structures and outlook will enable Australia’s 
First Peoples to recover or develop relational self-determination. That the drive 
towards constitutional recognition appears to be losing momentum291 is therefore 
disheartening. Substantive constitutional recognition is not the only step, but it is 
the next step. The experience and logic of transitional justice makes clear that 
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